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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-ooOooEDWIN GOSSNER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 15679

DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC., a
corporation, E. ODELL SUMMERS,
ORVAL E. PETERSEN, Defendants
and Respondents, and BERKELEY
BANK FOR COOPERATIVES, a corporation,
Defendant
Appellant.
-ooOooBRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
-ooOoo-

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
THE HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE
-ooOooDALE M. DORIUS
29 South Main Street
P. 0. Box U
Brigham City, UT 84302
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents, E. ODELL
SUMMERS & ORVAL E.
PETERSEN.

W. CLARK BURT
CALLISTER, GREEN, & NEBEKER
Suite BOO Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant, BERKELEY BANK
FOR COOPERATIVES.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interpleader action by Plaintiff, WHEREIN
Plaintiff tendered into court the amount of $31,635.29,
and wherein the Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers
and Orval E. Petersen, and the Defendant-Appellant,
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives claimed an interest in the
money tendered.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Berkeley Bank's Motions for a Directed Verdict and
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict were denied, and
the jury entered a verdict in favor of the DefendantsRespondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen, and
the court entered a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in accordance therewith.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E.
Petersen, seek an order sustaining the trial court order
in their favor, entitling them to a portion of the monies
tendered into court by the Plaintiff amounting to $12,127.67
for E. Odell summers and $12,467.13 for Orval E. Petersen.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval
E. Petersen, are dairy farmers.

Sometime prior to 1975

both men became members of the dairy cooperative, Defendant
Dairymen Associates, Inc. (hereinafter Dairymen), executing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
-1-Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

uniform marketing agreements with the cooperative.

Basic-

ally, the agreement provided that Dairymen would market all
milk produced by the dairy farmers, and in turn would reimburse the farmers in payment for the amount contributed.by
the farmers for the cooperative.
Dairymen contracted separately with an independent milk
hauler to pick up the milk from Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen
and later deliver it to Dairymen's various customers.

(T.

27).
In January, 1975, Dairymen's checks to Mr. Summers and
Mr. Petersen failed to clear the bank due to insufficient
funds in its account.

(T. 72,159).

Both Mr. Summers and

Mr. Petersen notified Dairymen that the bank had refused
payment of its checks.

(T. 72,159).

After telephone dis-

cussions with Dairymen concerning the bad checks, and in
view of Dairymen's shaky financial picture, both Mr. Summers
and Mr. Petersen told Dairymen that they considered the contract to have been breached and both desired to terminate
the contract.

(T.

72,74,159).

In March, 1975, Dairymen executed a security agreement
with Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives,

(hereinafter Berkeley

Bank) wherein Dairymen delivered two promissory notes payable to Berkeley Bank in the amounts of $380,000.00

(Ex.

and $18 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (Ex . l 0 ) .
Dairymen requested that each of its members sign an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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9)

"Installment Promissory Note" in the amount of $14,000.00.
(T. 28,29).

William Henry Finney, at the time general

manager of Dairymen, described the notes as basically a
commitment on the producer's part to continue shipping milk
to Dairymen.

(Ex. 52)

Both Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen

refused to sign the notes and again expressed their feelings
that Dairymen had breached the agreement and their desire
to terminate membership in the association.

(T. 20,30,52,74).

On April 3, 1975, Dairymen through its attorney,
threatened legal action in the event Mr. Summers and Mr.
(Ex. 4,26).

Petersen terminated the agreement.

On April 9, 1975, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen, through
their attorney, wrote a letter stating that because of
Dairymen's shaky financial situation, mismanagement of
affairs, the incurring of heavy debt, and issuance of the
checks with insufficient finds, both wished to terminate
their association with Dairymen.

(Ex. 22).

Dairymen invited Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen to attend
an association meeting on April 26, 1975 to discuss their
grievances with the cooperative.

(Ex. 13).

Dairymen rejected

requests that the agreement be terminated on that occasion.
In July, 1975, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen instructed
Mr. George Thornley, a milk hauler, to stop delivering
their milk to Dairymen and begin delivering their milk
directly to Gessner Cheese Company.

Both farmers also
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notified both Dairymen and Edwin 0. Gassner of their intentions.

(T.

76,164,165).

From July, 1975, to November, 1975, when Dairymen went
out of businesss, Mr. Thornley delivered the Respondents'
milk directly to Gassner.

(T. 23)

However apparently be-

cause of Gassner's fear that he would incur legal action
from Dairymen, he continued to send payment to Dairymen in
July and August.

No payments were sent in at least October

and November of 1975.

However, Dairymen continued to claim

the milk delivered to Gassner from Mr. Summers and Mr.
Petersen on its accounts receivables.

It also continued to

send checks to the two farmers for the milk.
It did this even though it knew that Respondents were
delivering milk directly to Gassner (T. 32) and despite the
fact that Mr. Thornley was terminated as a Dairymen hauler
on October 1, 1975.

(T.

55).

Both Respondents continued to accept the checks because
Gassner had not tendered payment to them to that point.
However, checks sent in September, October and November of
1975 failed to clear the bank.
In November of 1975, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen filed
an action against Dairymen and Gassner Cheese Company,
67 to Mr. Summers and
claiming amounts owe d th em Of $12,127.
$12,467.13 to Mr. Petersen.

(Ex. 14, 28).

Dairymen failed

to answer the complaint and a Default Judgment was entered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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against it.

o.

(Ex. 15,29).

Gossner Cheese Company and Edwin

Gossner were dismissed from the suit with prejudice by

Stipulation and Order (EX. 17,20,31) pursuant to an agreement that Gassner tender the money into court by filing an
interpleader action.

(T. 80,99,194).

The dismissal was

filed only after the Stipulation and Order were agreed to.
(T. 109).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
At the close of the evidence Appellant's counsel moved
the Court for a directed verdict in its favor on the basis
that the Respondents failed to meet their respective burdens
of proof and upon the fact that issues raised at this trial
were res judicata.

(T. 210).

The Court denied the motion.

The Court thereafter entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on November 28, 1977.

The Appel-

lant filed its Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict and for a New Trial on December 7, 1977.

(R.

239).

The Court denied these motions and entered a Memorandum
Decision on January 17, 1978,

(R. 267) and an Order Denying

Appellants' Motions on January 27, 1978.

(R. 268).

The

trial court was correct in denying these motions for the
following reasons:
POINT IA
THE MONEY TENDERED INTO COURT BY THE
PLAINTIFF WAS OWED TO MR. SUMMERS AND
MR. PETERSEN FOR MILK DELIVERED DIRECTLY
TO PLAINTIFF BY VIRTUE OF THE TERMINATION OF THE UNIFORM MARKETING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND DEFENDANT
DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC ..
Neither Mr. Summers or Mr. Petersen dispute that
Berkeley Bank has a security interest in the accounts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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receivables of Dairymen.

However, the money owed for milk

delivered to Gossner during the months in question is not
rightfully an account receivable on Dairymen's books.

That

milk was sent directly from Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen
to Gossner by an independent hauler, Mr. Thornley, whose
employment with Diarymen had been terminated on October 1, 1975.
(T. 55).

The milk was delivered with notice to all parties

that neither Mr. Summers or Mr. Petersen were operating under the terminated agreement with Dairymen.

(T. 76,164,165).

That both farmers continued to receive and accept
checks from Dairymen after the contract was terminated does
not necessarily waive the termination.
In Pedrini v. Mid-City Trailer Depot, Inc. 459 P2d
76 (Wash. 1969), the court stated:
"Diligence in recission is a relative
question, and whether or not there has
been an unreasonable delay in a given
case depends upon the particular circumstances of the case." 459 P2d at 78.
Likewise, in Eggen v. M & K Trailers and Mobile Home Brokers,
Inc., 482 P2d 435 (Colo. 1971), the court, in holding that
four to five months was not an unreasonable delay for a
buyer to effect a recission of a sales contract, explained:
" . . . a delay on the part of the buy~r
will be excused in excercising his r7ght
to rescind, if it is due to the prom1ses
of the seller that the defect will be
remedied, or to his requests that further
trial be made, or to other acts ?r declarations of the seller tending to 1nduce
delay."
482 P2d at 438.
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In Eggen, the seller repeatedly told the buyers that
the defects discovered by the buyers on a newly purchased
mobile home would be fixed.

Such assurances stalled the

buyers from fully rescinding the agreement.

Finally, when

after more than four months of assurances without action, the
buyers terminated the contract.
In the case before this court, Dairymen continually
resisted efforts by the Respondents to terminate the agreement after its original breach by threatening law suits.
Dairymen also wrongfully continued to bill Gessner for
milk delivered by Mr. Thornley, even after the latter's
termination of employment as a hauler for Dairymen on
October 1, 1975.
These actions deterred Gessner from paying Mr. Summers
and Mr. Petersen for the milk he received from them.

It

certainly prevented Respondents from rejecting checks sent
by Dairymen representing payment for the milk for fear that
if they failed to accept the checks, they might not receive
any payment for the milk at all.
It is crystal clear that from the first time that
Dairymen's check was returned for lack of sufficient funds
that Respondents considered that action a breach of the
agreement and they in turn expressed an intention to
terminate.

Evidences of this intention were manifested

in continued oral expressions, refusal to sign the "Installment Promissory Notes," in a written letter through their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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attorney dated April 9, 1975,

(Ex. 22), and finally their

action to quit delivering milk to Dairymen in July of 1975.
(T.

76).
The letter of April 9th, expressed concern over Dairy-

men's mismanagement of monies, its newly acquired debt and
the desire to terminate the membership of both Mr. Summers
and Mr. Petersen based on these observations and Dairymen's
earlier breach.
Yet, Dairymen at no time offered any assurances that
it was indeed financially sound enough to continue meeting
its obligations under the contract and in fact by September
of 1975 it could not longer meet its obligations and by the
beginning of 1976 had been declared bankrupt.
If there was any delay on the part of Respondents to
make an effective termination of the contract, there is
overwhelming evidence that the delay was caused by Dairymen's
threat of legal action and wrongful billing.
It is most clear that Respondents at all times intended
for the contract to be terminated.

It was only a matter of

how to effect such a termination without becoming financially
disabled.
The agreement having been terminated, Dairymen had no
legal right to place the amount of milk delivered from the
Respondents to Gassner as owing to it on its accounts
receivable list.

Yet they did so, billing Gassner accordingly.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the same time, they attempted to pay Respondents for the

milk that the Respondents themselves had delivered to
Gossner.

The checks sent for this purpose failed to clear

the bank during the months of September, October and
November of 1975.
This money should not have been paid by Dairymen.

It

was rightfully owed by Gossner to be paid directly to
Respondents.
POINT IB
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC., IN WEBER
COUNTY DOES NOT HAVE RES JUDICATA OR
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT ON THE
ISSUES AND PARTIES IN THIS ACTION.
As stated in Appellants brief, the elements of res
judicata as enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in East
Millcreek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 159 P2d 863 (Utah,
1949), are as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)

it must be between the same parties or privies;
it applies only where the claim, demand, or
cause of action is the same in both cases; and
the matter goes to final judgment, in other
words, a judgment on the merits.

See also Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P2d 946 (Utah 1962).
The general rule, as set forth in Appellant's brief, is
that a Default Judgment is a final judgment on the merits
for the purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Blache v. Blache, 160 P2d 136 (Calif. 1945); Tee~

Air Products, Inc. vs. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 445 P2d 426

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Ariz. 1968); Tarnoff v. Jones, 497 P2d 60 (Ariz. 1972);
Kernan v. Kernan, 369 P2d 451 (Nev. 1962).
However, there is an exception to the general rule that
a default judgment is a final judgment
collateral estoppel purposes.

for res judicata and

That exception comes into

play when there is more than one Defendant or one Plaintiff
in the action and a default judgment is entered against one
of the parties.
In Tarnoff v. Jones, supra, a default judgment was
entered against one of the Defendants, but no default was
obtained against the other Defendant.

In holding that res

judicata was not proper in this instance, the court stated:
"Since this judgment did not dispose of
the claim against Defendant Gaiber • •
. the judgment was not final and hence not
appealable. The doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to an interlocutory judgment." 497 P2d at 62.
In this case, the default judgment was entered against
Dairymen in Weber County when Dairymen failed to answer. But
that judgment did not have immediate effect upon Respondents' claim against Gassner.

Respondents were still free to

pursue their claim in that forum against Gossner without
incurring the burden of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Indeed Respondents would have been permitted in the normal
course of bringing the action to amend their pleadings or
parties.

They did not choose to do so for good reason.

-11-
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The record clearly shows and the testimony of the
Respondents is to the effect that a stipulation and order
were entered into by all parties to dismiss with prejudice
the action against Gassner as to all liability to the money
involved in his case because Gassner tendered the money
into this Court.

(Ex. 17, 20)

(T. 80, 99, 194).

The effect of this action was beneficial to all parties
involved.

Gassner saved legal fees; Berkeley Bank was given

an opportunity to prove that the money was due as an account
receivable on Dairymen's books; and if Respondents prevailed
against Gassner they would receive the money immediately
without resort to collection procedures to obtain the proceeds,
!
from the judgment.
Based on Tarnoff v. Jones, supra, the default judgment
against DAirymen had no res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect on Respondents action against Gassner in the Weber
County suit.

As such, authority cited by Appellant on

the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and
discharges of judgments in bankruptcy are inapplicable to
the peculiar circumstances of this case.
This forum simply represents a more convenient way to
determine whether or not the money Gossner owes for milk
delivered to his premises should be paid directly to the
Respondents.

All parties agreed to this.

(Ex

0

17, 2 0)

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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o

To permit Appellant Berkeley Bank to invoke the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel after having
entered into such a stipulation would clearly defraud the
concepts of fairness and equity.

Because of the peculiar

facts present in this case, Appellant should be barred from
raising these defenses.
POINT IC
THE RESPONDENTS MET THEIR BURDEN OF
PROOF THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO A
PORTION OF THE MONEY TENDERED INTO
COURT BY GOSSNER.
Much testimony was presented during the course of the
trial upon which reasonable minds could draw to determine
that the Respondents, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen, were
entitled to a portion of the money tendered into court by
Gossner.
Both Respondents testified that they instructed Mr.
Thornley and notified Mr. Gossner that milk would be
delivered directly to Gossner after July of 1975.
78, 163, 164, 165).

(T. 18,

Both Respondents testified that they

demanded payment from Gossner for the milk they had delivered to him.

(T. 78,165).

Mr. Summers testified that

he figured out the amount due him by Gossner by examining
Dairymen's checks during the months of September, October
and November of 1975, which were an attempt by Dairymen
to pay Mr. Summers for the milk he had delivered to
Gossner.

(T. 79).

These attempted payments are especially

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interesting in light of the fact that Mr. Summers had
refused and was not delivering milk to or through Dairymen
during these three (3) months and had notified it of that
fact.

(T. 76).
Mr. Petersen had determined the amount Gossner owed him

for delivered milk by adding up the pounds of milk which he
had record of delivering to Gossner and multiplying the
poundage by the price of the milk.

(T. 167). This amount he

testified corresponded with the amount which Dairymen
attempted to pay him.

(T.

168).

Gessner's son testified that the amount tendered into
court represents the amount of the invoice sent to Gossner
by Dairymen.

This invoice was consistent with the milk

tickets in Gessner's possession.

(T. 135).

There was

testimony presented that milk delivered by Thornley for
Respondents was written up on Dairymen tickets even after
instructions had been given to the contrary.

Gessner's son

had no record of exactly who brought what milk in.

(T.

136}.

Still, the evidence showed that Gossner owed the
Respondents money.

Dairymen did attempt to pay the Respond-

ents for the same amounts they alleged were owed to them by
Gossner.

Edwin 0. Gossner himself never denied owing money

to Respondents.

He was never called as a witness in this

action to rebut any of the testimony presented.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Based on the foregoing facts and testimony, it is
clear that reasonable minds could conclude that tbe
Respondents were entitled to a portion of the money
tendered by Gossner into court.

This is substantiated

by the verdict returned on the trial level by the jury in
this case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
1.

The Trial Court did not err in allowing testimony

as to issues which were res judicata, and allowing that
the pleadings be conformed to the evidence which was
presented at the trial.
Based on the arguments set forth in Point IB of
Respondents' brief, the Trial Court correctly denied Appellant's motion to invoke res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule lS(b), reads in
part:
. . . If evidence is objected to at
trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the p:esen~a
tion of the merits of the act1on w1ll
be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy t~e court that
the admission of such ev1dence would.
prejudice him in mainta~ning his act1on
or defense upon the mer1ts.
''
In this case, the court acknowledged that the original
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pleadings were different than the basis upon which recovery
by the Respondents was sought.

However, in reviewing the

record of the trial the court concluded:
"The court further finds that the
pleadings may be conformed to what
the evidence presented is. Since the
theory is not a surprise one but was
raised, certain pleadings prior to
this time, and that their theory, although not an amended pleading, was
advanced in their memorandum, briefs
and responses to motion for summary
judgment back in December of 1976.
So that the theory of the case and
the theory on which we've proceeded
certainly doesn't come as a surprise,
it being now nearly a year later."
(T. 155).
Based on Rule 15(b), the courts ruling on allowing
the pleadings to be conformed to the evidence is entirely
proper.

Appellant simply failed to convince the court

that it would be prejudiced by the action or that it was a
surprise.
2.

Respondents concede that the Court erred in

allowing hearsay evidence as to what Edwin 0. Gessner
allegedly said to the Respondents.

The evidence was

permitted on the assumption that Gassner would be called
later as a witness and would have an opportunity to rebut
the testimony.

He was not called.

But the evidence admitted, did not stand as a naked
prosecutor of Respondents' claim.

As stated throughout

Respondents' brief, there was substantial evidence to
support the verdict rendered in this case by the jury.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is no evidence whatsoever that the jury relied heavily
on this evidence to reach its verdict.

In view of tbaae

facts, this was harmless error.
3.

, .

The trial court did not err in qivinq Instructian

Number 7.

The question of whether or not the Respondeat&,

prior to September 1, 1975, had terminated any associatioa
with Dairymen is totally material to the issues.

There was

evidence that the contract had been terminated by the
Respondents.

The fact that the Respondents had

t~rminated

their agreement with Dairymen was material to the issue of
whether or not they were entitled to receive money directly
from Mr. Gassner for milk delivered during the months of
September, October, and November 1975.
The court also did not err in failing to give Appellant's
proposed instructions concerning the definition of a security
agreement.

That Instruction Number 7 covers the question

of the assignment of accounts receivable.
The Court did give instructions regarding the burden of
proof of the parties in Instruction Number 5 and Instruction
Number 6.
The Court did adequately instruct the jury.
4.

The evidence clearly was sufficient to justify the

verdict rendered in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Respondents, having met their burden of proving that
they were entitled to a portion of the money tendered into
this court by Edwin 0. Gassner, respectfully request this
court to sustain the judgment rendered in Box Elder County
and award $12,127.67 to E. Odell Summers and $12,467.13 to
Orval E. Petersen.

Attorney for Defendants-Respondents,
E. ODELL SUMMERS & ORVAL E.
PETERSEN
P. 0. Box u
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, UT 84302
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